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9.1   Introduction
There is much anecdotal evidence of poor working conditions in agency 
work, but much less hard evidence. None of the research referred to can 
diﬀerentiate between factors related to agency work per se (as a form 
of  employment) and those related to the job or the worker. (Storrie 
2002, 56)
Employment in temporary help service (THS) fi rms has increased 
throughout Europe over the last decade. This development has prompted 
the European Commission (EC) to propose a directive to safeguard THS 
workers’ working conditions. In 2002 it issued a proposal for a European 
Parliament and Council Directive on working conditions for THS workers 
(EIRO 2002; European Commission 2002), which aims to ensure that tem-
porary workers are not discriminated against, receiving at least as favorable 
a treatment as a regular comparable worker in the fi rm where she or he is 
posted. The relevant dimensions are the basic working and employment 
conditions, including duration of working time, rest and holiday periods, 
time of work, and seniority.
This concern comes from widespread evidence that workers in THS fi rms 
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face worse working conditions than comparable workers in the placement 
fi rm. Evidence from Houseman (2001) suggests that THS may be used to 
save on worker benefi t costs, such as health insurance and pension contribu-
tions. These concerns extend to wage rates, as there seems to be evidence of 
lower wages for THS workers.
Concern about workers in THS has also focused on whether they remain in 
low- paying, dead- end jobs or if  they fi nd, should they so desire, employment 
in a standard working career. High turnover involves a loss of fi rm- specifi c 
human capital, a decrease in productivity if  production depends on con-
tinuous cooperation of workers, and possibly less coverage by trade unions, 
factors that may contribute to poorer career prospects. On the contrary, THS 
could serve as a screening method (Autor 2001; Houseman 2001) at little 
cost for the fi rm; that is, without a commitment about a future employment 
contract. Since THS work typically matches a worker with several fi rms, it 
can be seen as a job- matching mechanism.
The discussion has thus concentrated on whether workers in THS employ-
ment earn lower wages and whether THS employment enables workers to 
start a better career. There are numerous studies for the United States that 
fi nd that THS workers receive lower wages than other workers; for example, 
Segal and Sullivan (1997), who report an average wage diﬀerence of about 
28 percent, which is reduced to about 3 percent when observable and time-
 invariant unobservable characteristics are considered. (See also, among oth-
ers, Blank [1998] or Nollen [1996].)
Workers may accept lower wages in THS fi rms because the employment 
in these fi rms allows a subsequent job match with better pay or more stable 
careers. Autor and Houseman (2005), using random placement assignments, 
do not fi nd that THS work is associated with stable careers in post- THS 
employment. For welfare recipients, however, Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske 
(2005) fi nd that work in THS is associated with better outcomes than not 
working at all.
The evidence for European countries is mixed. For example, Forde and 
Slater (2005) report a wage penalty of about 11 percent for men and 6 per-
cent for women in THS in contrast to comparable workers in the United 
Kingdom. Zijl, van den Berg, and Heyma (2004) fi nd for the Netherlands 
that THS work is associated with subsequent stable employment spells. 
Similarly, Amuedo- Dorantes, Malo, and Muñoz- Bullón (2006), for Spain, 
Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2002), for the United Kingdom, and Ichino, 
Mealli, and Nannicini (2006), for Italy, fi nd that THS work is associated 
with subsequent stable employment. However, Kvasnicka (2005) fi nds for 
Germany that THS work does not improve the subsequent careers of such 
workers, and Antoni and Jahn (2006) fi nd that THS workers in Germany 
are increasingly found in repeated spells of THS work.
We use linked employer- employee data, obtained from the Ministry of 
Employment in Portugal, to analyze wages of workers in THS. These admin-
istrative data cover the universe of Portuguese workers in the private sector 
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for the period 1995 to 2000. The panel dimension of these data allow us to 
control for worker and industry specifi c eﬀects.
The purpose of the chapter is twofold. We analyze, fi rst of all, if  THS 
workers earn lower wages than comparable workers in other sectors, by esti-
mating wage regressions. Because participation in THS work is not random, 
we control for workers’ fi xed eﬀects in our estimations, taking advantage of 
the longitudinal nature of the data. We perform the analysis separately for 
men and women as well as for younger and older workers, since these groups 
tend to fare diﬀerently in the labor market. (We also perform the analyses on 
the pooled sample.) Secondly, we analyze workers’ wages before and after 
spells of THS. On the one hand, we want to assess if  THS work leads to 
lower wages in subsequent employment—that is, evidence of a stigma eﬀect. 
On the other hand, we want to investigate if  workers experienced a particu-
lar wage development before entering THS. For example, their wages could 
be deteriorating relative to similar workers, in which case the adverse labor 
market conditions would provide the motivation to search for a THS job.
Our empirical results suggest that THS workers earn about 1 percent less 
than similar workers in other fi rms, once their observable and unobservable 
attributes are controlled for. However, disaggregation of the sample by age 
and gender reveals interesting diﬀerences across groups of workers. Younger 
workers, both men and women, earn higher wages in THS fi rms than their 
peers in other fi rms. Prime- age workers, in particular men, earn a lower 
wage in THS fi rms than similar workers in other fi rms. Also interestingly, 
for young workers, THS is not associated with a stigma that slows their 
wage progression after they start to work in the THS sector. In contrast, for 
prime- age and older workers, in particular males, wage progression after 
entering THS is slower than for similar workers not engaged in THS. Before 
entering THS fi rms, prime- age workers, both men and women, see their 
wages deteriorate relative to their peers, suggesting that adverse labor market 
conditions might motivate them to search for a THS job. For young workers, 
we do not detect any pre- THS wage trend.
9.2   Background
9.2.1   The Association between THS Work and Wages
The distinguishing feature of work for a THS fi rm is the tripartite nature 
of the relationship and the commercial nature of the contract signed between 
the THS fi rm and the placement fi rm, which sets it apart from a traditional 
labor contract between a worker and a fi rm. Even though a particular assign-
ment of a worker is temporary, it is not the duration of the contract that 
characterizes this sector.
While there is widespread belief  that THS workers earn lower wages than 
comparable workers, in particular in countries where labor legislation is not 
stringent or trade union coverage is low, there are also reasons, and evidence, 
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that point to the opposite direction. Temporary help service workers may 
earn a higher wage, which would compensate for the risk of a more variable 
income stream than comparable workers. It is also sometimes stressed that 
THS fi rms have diﬃculty recruiting workers and need to oﬀer favorable 
conditions to attract them. Storrie (2002) reports that at the upper end of 
the pay scale, for instance in the health sector, THS workers seem to enjoy 
better pay and possibly better working conditions than regular workers. The 
wages in THS fi rms is thus an empirical issue that we will address in more 
detail in the following.
Some THS fi rms may choose to oﬀer free general training instead of 
higher wages to attract more workers and to identify better- quality work-
ers (Autor 2001). In general, the need to attract workers and the existence 
of economies of scale in the provision of some types of training have been 
pointed out as reasons why THS fi rms may provide more training than 
legally required. Such training could result in higher wages in post- THS 
employment.
On the contrary, Storrie (2002) reports evidence of  circumvention of 
employment standards for THS workers, especially in terms of  pay and 
working time regulations, and also evidence of other, illegal abuse. The short 
employment spells, possibly combined with low investment in human capi-
tal, and fewer workers’ rights due to lower coverage by trade unions, are 
typically factors that characterize poor career prospects.
9.2.2   Legal Setting in Portugal
The market for THS is tightly regulated in Portugal.1 Permission to oper-
ate as a THS fi rm is granted by the Ministry of Employment and Social 
Security. Candidates must show proof of a clean criminal record, previous 
compliance with labor law and tax and social security duties, technical capac-
ity (i.e., a qualifi ed director with experience of running human resources and 
supporting administrative staﬀ ), as well as a sound fi nancial situation.2 Tem-
porary help service fi rms are allowed a wide range of activities, which include 
recruitment and selection of  personnel, vocational orientation, training, 
consulting, and human resources management. The operation of the fi rm is 
regularly monitored by the Bureau of Labor Inspection and it must present 
records of workers hired out to using fi rms every six months.
The work contract is signed between the THS fi rm and the worker. The 
formal employer is thus the THS, and not the user fi rm, and it is responsible 
in particular for paying the workers, fulfi lling the employer’s Social Secu-
rity obligations, providing insurance against work- related accidents, and 
allocating a minimum of 1 percent of the total turnover to training. (The 
1. Decree- Law 358/ 89, Law 39/ 96, and Law 146/ 99.
2. A fund linked to the national minimum wage must be deposited, or a bank or insurance 
company guarantee presented, which is used for wage payments if  the company does not pay 
its workers.
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THS fi rm is legally forbidden to charge the worker for training provided.) 
The user fi rm is responsible for fulfi lling regulations on health and security 
at the workplace.
The work contract between the worker and the THS can be open ended 
or of limited duration. If  open ended, the worker is entitled to pay, even in 
periods when she or he is not actually assigned to a using fi rm. The amount is 
specifi ed by collective bargaining or, if  the worker is not covered, two- thirds 
of the national minimum wage.
Firms have to justify the need for temporary workers and a narrow set of 
reasons is permitted: to replace workers on leave, for seasonal work, in case 
of a temporary increase in product demand, or to bridge recruitment gaps, 
while the process to fi ll a vacancy is taking place.
The contract between the THS fi rm and the using fi rm must also specify, 
among other things, the duration of the assignment (which depends on the 
reason for use of temporary work, with a maximum limit of six months to 
two years), the description of tasks to be performed, the wage the using fi rm 
pays its workers who perform similar tasks, and the amount paid to the THS 
fi rm. A THS worker is entitled to the wage set by collective bargaining for 
THS work or the wage paid by the user fi rm to similar workers, whichever 
is higher. Because these rules aim at providing equal treatment for regular 
and THS workers, we would expect to see no, or a moderate, pay diﬀerential 
between THS and regular workers. Over 90 percent of the THS workers are 
covered by a collective bargaining contract, signed between trade unions 
and employer representatives.3
The regulations are monitored and enforced by the Bureau of  Labor 
Inspection. However, situations of  noncompliance with the law are fre-
quently discussed in the press, where THS owners associations demand 
stricter controls by the Bureau, arguing that law- obeying fi rms are subject 
to unfair competition by fi rms that do not fulfi ll the law, especially the pay-
ment of taxes and Social Security contributions. Trade unions, on the other 
hand, claim that workers’ rights are not always respected and also demand 
stricter monitoring. Finally, the Bureau of Labor Inspection claims that the 
fi rms in the sector are subject to close scrutiny and argues for higher legal 
sanctions to increase compliance.
Although the legalization and regulation of this type of work took place 
relatively early in comparison to other European countries, the use of THS 
is not as widespread in Portugal as in other European countries. In 1999, it 
comprised about 1 percent of total employment, below the European Union 
average of about 1.4 percent. In terms of growth, although employment in the 
sector more than doubled between 1995 and 1999, its growth has been modest 
when compared to most other European countries (Storrie 2002, 23).
3. In Portugal, a contract signed between workers’ and employers’ representatives is often 
extended to all workers in a sector or fi rm, irrespective of their union membership status.
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9.3   Data
The study is based on linked employer- employee data collected annually 
by the Ministry of Employment in Portugal. The data cover all fi rms with 
wage earners in manufacturing and services in the private sector; because 
data provision is compulsory only for companies with wage earners, the cov-
erage of the agricultural sector is low. Public administration and domestic 
work are not covered. Reported data include the fi rm’s industry, location, 
employment, ownership (foreign, private, or public) and sales, and the work-
er’s gender, age, occupation, schooling, date of admission into the company, 
monthly earnings, and duration of work. We use data from 1995 to 2000, 
since identifi cation of THS work was not possible for earlier years.
The Portuguese Classifi cation of Industries reports, under code 74500, 
fi rms in “labor recruitment and provision of personnel.”4 This is the defi -
nition we use to identify temporary help service fi rms and their workers.5 
Given the relevance of  the distinction between stocks and fl ows for this 
activity (with high worker turnover), it should be stressed that the data refer 
to the stock of workers at a reference week in October each year.6 Wage earn-
ers aged sixteen to sixty- fi ve years were selected for analysis. We consider 
only the worker’s main job, defi ned as the job where the most hours were 
worked per month. Extensive checks have been performed to guarantee the 
accuracy of the data, using gender, date of birth, highest educational level, 
and starting date in a company (details on the procedures followed to clean 
the panel can be found in Cardoso [2005]).
The administrative nature of the data and the legal requirement for the 
fi rm to post the data in a space public to its workers contribute to its reliabil-
ity. Workers are identifi ed by a personal identifi er, based on a transformation 
of the social security number, and it is thus possible to track them over time, 
as long as they work in the private sector. If  they are missing from the data-
base, the workers could be, among other situations, unemployed, inactive, 
employed in the public administration, or self- employed without dependent 
workers, and we cannot ascertain the employment status.
In the analyses that follow, we will keep the whole population of workers 
who ever had a THS job, while limiting the data on workers who never had 
a THS job to a 10 percent sample, so as to keep computations manageable. 
For each worker sampled, all the available observations on his or her work 
history were kept for analysis. We report results on the overall sample, as 
well as separately for women and men of sixteen to twenty- fi ve years of age 
and for women and men of twenty- six to sixty- fi ve years of age.
4. This classifi cation closely follows NACE, the Classifi cation of Economic Activities in the 
European Community. Before 1995, a diﬀerent industry classifi cation, which did not assign a 
specifi c code to this activity, was used.
5. This defi nition has the disadvantage that we cannot distinguish between managers and 
clerical staﬀ that operate the THS and the workers who are hired out to using fi rms.
6. Because of the timing of observations, we do not analyze the job tenure with THS fi rms 
because not all jobs of short duration are captured in the data.
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Gross hourly wages were computed and were defl ated using the Consumer 
Price Index (with the year 2000 as the base period). Wage outliers, that is, 
hourly wages of  less than half  the fi rst percentile or above twenty times 
percentile 99, have been dropped from the analysis.
9.4   Descriptive Evidence on the Labor Force of 
THS Firms and Their Career Prospects
The number of fi rms and workers in the THS sector increased from 1995 
to 2000, and we observe a rising share in overall employment, from 0.5 to 
1 percent. (These fi gures are a lower bound on the overall number of THS 
workers, as short spells are underrepresented because of how the data are 
collected.) The number of fi rms, although increasing in absolute numbers, 
had a share of about 0.1 percent of all fi rms in the private sector. (A tabula-
tion of the development over time is given in the appendix, table 9A.1.)
Table 9.1 provides the descriptive statistics of our estimating sample, by 
THS status. On average, THS workers had a wage lower than other workers, 
with a mean hourly wage diﬀerence of about 23 percent. We also see that the 
dispersion of wages is lower for THS workers, a fi nding also evident in fi gure 
9.1, where we plot the two wage distributions, pooling the observations from 
the six years. The graph shows that the distribution of wages for THS work-
ers is more concentrated, with a higher peak and a thinner upper tail.
We observe a similar percentage of women in THS fi rms as in other fi rms 
in the private sector (about 42 percent). Temporary help service workers are, 
on average, four years younger than workers in the rest of the private sector, 
who are, on average, thirty- six years old. Temporary help service workers 
are, on average, slightly better educated than other workers (about 50 percent 
of THS workers have six school years or less, compared to 61 percent in 
other sectors; nevertheless, there are fewer workers with a higher- education 
diploma in THS fi rms than in other fi rms; i.e., 4 versus 6 percent). There 
are also more low- skilled and administrative workers in THS than in other 
fi rms. We see that workers in THS have short tenures with their fi rms, with 
68 percent of THS workers having tenures of less than one year; in contrast, 
for all other workers the fraction of workers who have tenures of less than 
one year is 18 percent. The incidence of part time is higher in THS fi rms 
than in the rest of the economy (25 percent versus 9 percent).
Temporary help services fi rms are concentrated in the Lisbon region (78 
percent, as opposed to 42 percent for the remaining sectors).7
For 2000 only, data on the type of contract are available, indicating that 
7. The agencies in Lisbon have, on average, a larger volume of business than companies in the 
rest of the economy, and the share of the market held by the fi ve largest fi rms, either in terms of 
employment or sales volume, has remained stable at about 33 percent (not shown in the table). 
These fi gures are consistent with those reported in Storrie (2002) and they show Portugal as 
one of the countries where THS is least concentrated in Europe; only the United Kingdom and 
Germany have a lower market concentration.
316    René Böheim and Ana Rute Cardoso
74 percent of THS workers have a fi xed- term contract, which compares to 
15 percent of the workers in the rest of the private sector.
9.5   Lower Pay in THS Firms?
The comparison of mean wages points to a substantial and signifi cant 
wage diﬀerence between THS and regular workers, despite the stringent 
legal requirements. In this section, we investigate in more detail if  such wage 
diﬀerences are still evident once we control for the fi rm and worker char-
acteristics.
Table 9.2 reports the estimated coeﬃcients (and robust standard errors) 
of wage regressions where we estimate the hourly wages of workers in the 
private sector. We use several empirical specifi cations for men and women 
who are sixteen to twenty- fi ve years of  age and for men and women of 
Table 9.1 Descriptive statistics
THS workers Regular workers
Variable  Mean  
Standard 
deviation  Mean  
Standard 
deviation
Hourly wage (log) 6.416 (0.390) 6.519 (0.563)
Hourly wage (PTE) 673.784 (458.229) 831.341 (829.515)
Female 0.416 0.421
Lisbon 0.777 0.418
Education
  Four years 0.304 0.378
  Six years 0.207 0.232
  Nine years 0.185 0.148
  Twelve years 0.253 0.161
  Sixteen years 0.040 0.061
Age 31.514 (10.383) 35.879 (11.142)
Occupation
  Profes., scientists 0.009 0.031
  Middle manag. 0.044 0.097
  Administrative workers 0.257 0.159
  Service and sales workers 0.104 0.134
  Farmers 0.005 0.003
  Skilled workers and craftsmen 0.275 0.266
  Machine operators, assembly workers 0.100 0.132
  Unskilled workers 0.198 0.153
Tenure
   1 year 0.680 0.177
  1  tenure  2 years 0.125 0.115
  2  tenure  3 years 0.052 0.083
  Part- time 0.246 0.085
Available for 2000 only:
 Fixed- term contract 0.736 0.145
 N  83,022    1,074,162   
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ages twenty- six to sixty- fi ve. (The full estimation results are provided in the 
appendix, where we also report estimation results for the complete sample.)
Specifi cation 1 controls for location of the fi rm and age and education 
of the workers (and indicators for the year of observation). Specifi cation 
2 controls in addition for the workers’ occupation, which is one of the fol-
lowing categories: senior managers, professionals or scientists: junior man-
agers; administrative workers; service and sales workers; farmers; skilled 
workers and craftsmen; machine operators, assembly workers; and unskilled 
 workers.
Because workers do not randomly choose to work for a THS fi rm, any 
observed wage diﬀerence between THS and other workers may be caused 
by personal characteristics not observed by us. We therefore estimate wage 
regressions where we control for worker unobservable quality by introducing 
worker fi xed eﬀects.8 The estimated coeﬃcients from these estimations are 
presented in columns (3) and (4) of table 9.2, where specifi cation 3 (specifi ca-
tion 4) has the same set of controls as specifi cation 1 (specifi cation 2).
8. Identifi cation in this regressions of the impact of education on wages is feasible given that 
a share of the workforce is observed changing—increasing—its education level. These shares 
are 2 percent, 2 percent, 2 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, for workers initially observed 
with four, six, nine, and twelve years of education.
Fig. 9.1  Wage distribution for THS and other workers, 1995–2000
Source: Own computations based on Portugal (1995 to 2000).
Note: The graph plots the wage distribution of workers in the THS sector and in the rest of 
the economy, pooling observations from 1995 to 2000. Wages above the 99th percentile are not 
plotted. Wages are defl ated to 2000 values using the Consumer Price Index.
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The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations show that younger women 
who work for a THS fi rm receive a higher wage than women who work for 
other fi rms. We estimate that they receive a wage that is about 5 to 7 per-
cent greater than similar workers in other fi rms. See columns (1) and (2) in 
table 9.2. The results from the fi xed- eﬀects regressions indicate that younger 
women who start to work in THS fi rms have a higher wage than they would 
earn in the regular sector. This diﬀerence in wage development is estimated 
to be around 4 to 5 percent. See columns (3) and (4) in table 9.2.
For younger men—while they earn, on average, a wage that is some 2 
percent greater in THS fi rms than in other fi rms—these diﬀerences are not 
as pronounced as for young women. Young men’s wages are estimated to 
increase by about 1 to 2 percent if  they start to work in a THS fi rm. All these 
estimated wage diﬀerences are statistically signifi cant at an error level of 5 
percent or less.
Prime- age women working in THS fi rms earn about 12 to 13 percent less 
than similar women in other fi rms. According to our fi xed- eﬀects estimates, 
their wages are estimated to decrease on starting to work with a THS fi rm. 
Table 9.2 Estimated wage diﬀerences for THS and regular workers
OLS Fixed- eﬀects
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(Standard 
error)
(Standard 
error)
(Standard 
error)
(Standard 
error)
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Sixteen to twenty- fi ve years of age
  Women .077 .052 .050 .039
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗
  Obs. 118,914 103,076 118,914 103,076
  Men .027 .021 .019 .013
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗
  Obs. 134,774 112,916 134,774 112,916
Twenty- six to sixty- fi ve years of age
  Women –.135 –.118 –.006 –.010
.003∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.004)∗ (.004)∗∗
  Obs. 367,492 346,779 367,492 346,779
  Men –.226 –.164 –.058 –.054
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
  Obs.  536,004  512,917  536,004  512,917
Note: The independent variable is (log) real hourly wages. Specifi cations 1 and 2 are based on 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) wage regressions and specifi cations 3 and 4 are fi xed- 
eﬀects panel wage regressions. All specifi cations control for location of the fi rm, age, and edu-
cation of the workers, and the year of observation. Specifi cations 2 and 4 control in addition 
for the workers’ occupation. The full set of  estimation results are provided in the appendix, 
tables 9A.3 to 9A.6. Robust standard errors. Estimations based on Portugal (1995 to 2000).
∗∗∗Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
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Although the penalty for starting in a THS fi rm is statistically signifi cant at 
conventional confi dence levels, the point estimate is at about 1 percent and 
thus not overly important from an economic perspective.
For prime- age male workers, we obtain coeﬃcients from the pooled OLS 
regression that indicate a remarkably lower average wage in THS than in the 
regular sector. The wage penalty is estimated to be between 16 and 23 per-
cent. In addition, controlling for fi xed characteristics, these workers experi-
ence a wage decrease of about 5 percent upon starting with the THS fi rm.
9.6   Wages Before and After Working in THS Firms
We proceed placing the spells of THS employment in the context of the 
workers’ careers. The wages of those workers who chose to work for a THS 
fi rm could have been deteriorating relative to similar workers prior to enter-
ing a THS fi rm. This relative wage loss could have been their motivation 
to start a THS job. A second issue concerns the workers’ careers once they 
start working for a THS fi rm and their wage progression thereafter. Two 
diﬀerent hypotheses on the wage development on entering the sector may be 
formulated. Temporary help service fi rms typically place workers in several 
fi rms—this improves their position to fi nding a good job match, possibly 
leading to being formally hired by a fi rm that already hired them through the 
THS fi rm. As such, a worker would have already accumulated some fi rm-
 specifi c human capital, and we then expect the worker to have a comparable, 
if  not faster, wage progression than other workers on leaving the THS fi rm. 
Alternatively, working for a THS might be interpreted as a signal of lower 
ability by employers and would result in fewer and/ or worse job oﬀers than 
other workers would receive. This kind of mechanism would lead to poorer 
employment prospects for former THS workers and their wages would be 
lower than those of otherwise similar workers.
In the vein of  Segal and Sullivan (1998) and Jacobson, LaLonde, and 
Sullivan (1993), we construct a set of dummy variables to capture the num-
ber of  years before or after the start of  the THS spell. For each worker, 
the dummy variable Dt
k is 1 if  the worker at time t is k years away from the 
start of the THS spell. Because our data cover six years, we have allowed k 
to range between –2 and 2, with a negative (positive) k indicating the time 
before (after) the start of a spell of THS employment. If  the worker works 
for a THS fi rm at time t, the dummy variable Dt
0 is equivalent to a dummy 
variable on THS work, similar to the one used in the previous specifi ca-
tions.9 We report results including controls for location, age, education, and 
worker- fi xed eﬀects, and the year of observation (with and without occu-
pation included). For this part of  the analysis, we dropped workers who 
9. We have also used dummy variables for the post- THS wages that indicate the time since 
the end of the THS employment. However, since most THS spells are of short duration, the 
interpretation of our fi ndings changes little. These results are available at request from the 
authors.
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had more than one spell of THS, which led to an exclusion of 7 percent of 
workers who ever had a THS spell.
Table 9.3 reports the estimated coeﬃcients for the indicator variables that 
control for employment episodes before and after the start of the THS spell. 
Focusing on the estimated coeﬃcient on THS, the estimations confi rm the 
previous results—that is, young workers earn a higher wage than in regular 
contracts. In contrast, older workers earn lower wages in THS fi rms than in 
other fi rms, with the diﬀerence being smaller for women than for men.
Before entering THS, we observe that there are no diﬀerences in terms of 
wages for young workers between those who started to work for a THS fi rm 
and those who did not. The motivation to enter THS seems to be diﬀerent 
for younger than for older workers, because we estimate that older workers, 
both men and women, see their wages deteriorate relative to similar workers 
before starting to work in a THS fi rm, suggesting that adverse labor market 
conditions may motivate prime- age workers to search for a THS job.
After the start of the THS spell, we estimate that young female workers 
enjoy higher wages than their peers, at least for the two years we are able 
to investigate, a wage diﬀerence of some 2 to 4 percent. We do not fi nd this 
pattern for young male THS workers. For them, post- THS wages are not 
signifi cantly diﬀerent from similar workers in other sectors, after accounting 
for worker- unobservable quality. Older female workers are estimated to have 
about 1 percent lower wages than women who did not work for a THS fi rm, 
but the diﬀerence is smaller than in the years before the THS spell, where 
it amounted to some 3 percent. Older male THS workers receive about 4 
percent less than comparable workers before and after their THS spell.
9.7   Conclusion
Using unique, linked employer- employee data from Portugal that cover 
the entire private sector, we investigate whether workers in THS fi rms receive 
a lower wage than workers who work for other fi rms. Despite the extensive 
legal protection of  THS workers, we observe a wage diﬀerence of  about 
23 percent for THS workers in the raw data. Once we control for standard 
human capital indicators, the diﬀerential is estimated to be 9 percent. The 
available data allow a more careful analysis in that we are able to control for 
unobservable workers’ characteristics by using workers’ fi xed eﬀects in our 
estimations. Controlling for this type of factors, the wage penalty of THS 
workers is reduced to 1 to 2 percent for the overall labor force.
However, interesting diﬀerences emerge across groups of workers: young 
and older, males and females. For young workers, working for a THS fi rm 
results in wages that are higher than other sectors. The diﬀerence is particu-
larly high for women who earn about 4 to 5 percent higher wages in THS 
than elsewhere; for young men the diﬀerence is about 1 percent. In contrast, 
for older workers THS work is associated with a wage penalty, which is larger 
for males than for females.
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The wage developments before starting to work for THS are clearly 
diﬀerent for young and older workers, which may result in a diﬀerent motiva-
tion to start working for a THS fi rm. Before entering a THS fi rm, prime- age 
workers see their wages deteriorate relative to similar workers, suggesting 
that adverse labor market conditions motivate them to search for a THS job. 
For younger workers, we cannot detect any pre- TWA wage trend.
The impact of THS employment on the subsequent career is diﬀerent for 
young and older workers, too. For young females, wages are higher one and 
two years after starting to work for THS than for comparable women in 
other fi rms. For them, the training, networking, or other skills provided by 
THS fi rms lead to a faster wage growth than for similar workers elsewhere in 
the economy. For young males, the results do not diﬀer signifi cantly between 
those who worked for a THS fi rm and those who did not. For older work-
ers, we identify once again a detrimental impact of THS work, since after 
the start of the THS spell, their wages remain signifi cantly below those of 
similar workers not in THS, particularly for males.
The evidence collected lends support to attempts (namely by the Euro-
pean Commission) to safeguard the workers in THS fi rms and their subse-
quent career progression, in particular for prime- age and older workers. For 
young workers, the evidence suggests that working for a THS fi rm can be an 
entry gate and stepping stone in the labor market.
Appendix
Table 9A.1 THS fi rms and workers in Portugal, 1995–2000
   Firms  Workers  
1995 148 7,637
(0.10) (0.46)
1996 158 9,415
(0.10) (0.57)
1997 184 13,072
(0.11) (0.74)
1998 203 15,634
(0.11) (0.86)
1999 223 17,179
(0.11) (0.89)
2000 243 20,085
   (0.11)  (1.00)  
Note: Own calculations based on MTSS, 1995–2000, Portugal. Values in parentheses indicate 
percentage of all private sector.
Table 9A.2 Wage regressions, all workers
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(Standard 
error)
(Standard 
error)
(Standard 
error)
(Standard 
error)
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
THS work –.122 –.097 –.012 –.016
(.001)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Lisbon .164 .165 .039 .040
(.0008)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Female –.241 –.207
(.0008)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗
Educ: four years .115 .073 –.035 –.039
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗
Educ: six years .281 .190 –.035 –.043
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗
Educ: nine years .478 .313 –.019 –.031
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.011)∗ (.011)∗∗∗
Educ: twelve years .650 .398 .006 –.004
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.011) (.011)
Educ: sixteen years 1.272 .766 .156 .132
(.003)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗
Age .050 .039 .080 .072
(.0002)∗∗∗ (.0002)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗
Age sq. –.0004 –.0003 –.0005 –.0005
(2.97e- 06)∗∗∗ (2.96e- 06)∗∗∗ (7.30e- 06)∗∗∗ (7.70e- 06)∗∗∗
Const. 4.999 5.927 4.410 4.678
(.005)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗
Occupation (eight dummies) — yes — yes
Worker- fi xed eﬀects — — yes yes
Obs. 1,157,184 1,075,688 1,157,184 1,075,688
R2  .457  .516  .858  .862
Note: Adjusted R2 reported for the fi xed- eﬀects regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
regressions control for year of observation. Estimations based on MTSS, 1995–2000, Portugal.
∗∗∗Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
Table 9A.3 Wage regressions, women sixteen to twenty- fi ve
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(Standard 
error)
(Standard 
error)
(Standard 
error)
(Standard 
error)
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
THS work .077 .052 .050 .039
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗
Lisbon .108 .109 .019 .022
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
Educ: four years –.00008 –.010 –.167 –.226
(.016) (.018) (.110) (.122)∗
Educ: six years .052 .036 –.153 –.220
(.016)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗ (.108) (.120)∗
Educ: nine years .129 .095 –.146 –.217
(.016)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.107) (.120)∗
Educ: twelve years .263 .190 –.118 –.185
(.016)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.108) (.120)
Educ: sixteen years .718 .508 .036 –.057
(.017)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗ (.109) (.122)
Age .053 .012 .141 .075
(.007)∗∗∗ (.008) (.009)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗
Age sq. –.0006 .0002 –.002 –.0005
(.0002)∗∗∗ (.0002) (.0002)∗∗∗ (.0003)∗∗
Const. 5.096 5.965 4.165 5.129
(.074)∗∗∗ (.089)∗∗∗ (.150)∗∗∗ (.179)∗∗∗
Occupation (eight dummies) — yes — yes
Worker- fi xed eﬀects  — — yes yes
Obs. 118,914 103,076 118,914 103,076
R2  .34  .374  .673  .681
Note: Adjusted R2 reported for the fi xed- eﬀects regressions. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. All regressions control for year of observation. Estimations based on MTSS, 1995–
2000, Portugal.
∗∗∗Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
Table 9A.4 Wage regressions, men sixteen to twenty- fi ve
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(Standard 
error)
(Standard 
error)
(Standard 
error)
(Standard 
error)
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
THS work .027 .021 .019 .013
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗
Lisbon .124 .123 .046 .050
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
Educ: four years .020 .015 –.009 –.018
(.011)∗ (.012) (.034) (.041)
Educ: six years .069 .059 –.004 –.017
(.010)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.034) (.041)
Educ: nine years .140 .120 .021 .013
(.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.034) (.042)
Educ: twelve years .254 .199 .044 .038
(.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.035) (.043)
Educ: sixteen years .728 .512 .190 .158
(.013)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.042)∗∗∗ (.049)∗∗∗
Age .131 .079 .220 .142
(.007)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
Age sq. –.002 –.001 –.003 –.002
(.0002)∗∗∗ (.0002)∗∗∗ (.0002)∗∗∗ (.0003)∗∗∗
Const. 4.213 5.152 3.057 4.141
(.074)∗∗∗ (.090)∗∗∗ (.108)∗∗∗ (.145)∗∗∗
Occupation (eight dummies) — yes — yes
Worker- fi xed eﬀects — — yes yes
Obs. 134,774 112,916 134,774 112,916
R2  .28  .301  .642  .652
Note: Adjusted R2 reported for the fi xed- eﬀects regressions. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. All regressions control for year of observation. Estimations based on MTSS, 1995–
2000, Portugal.
∗∗∗Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
Table 9A.5 Wage regression, women twenty- six to sixty- fi ve
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(Standard 
error)
(Standard 
error)
(Standard 
error)
(Standard 
error)
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
THS work –.135 –.118 –.006 –.010
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.004)∗ (.004)∗∗
Lisbon .153 .149 .032 .031
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Educ: four years .054 .025 –.021 –.021
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.015) (.015)
Educ: six years .205 .125 –.022 –.025
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.016) (.016)
Educ: nine years .454 .263 –.020 –.020
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.016) (.017)
Educ: twelve years .638 .348 .003 .007
(.004)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.017) (.018)
Educ: sixteen years 1.250 .703 .100 .097
(.005)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗
Age .049 .039 .058 .057
(.0006)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Age sq. –.0005 –.0004 –.0003 –.0003
(7.44e- 06)∗∗∗ (7.15e- 06)∗∗∗ (.00002)∗∗∗ (.00002)∗∗∗
Const. 4.837 5.784 4.682 4.810
(.013)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.029)∗∗∗ (.031)∗∗∗
Occupation (eight dummies) — yes — yes
Worker- fi xed eﬀects — — yes yes
Obs. 367,492 346,779 367,492 346,779
R2  .451  .528  .872  .875
Note: Adjusted R2 reported for the fi xed- eﬀects regressions. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. All regressions control for year of observation. Estimations based on MTSS, 1995–
2000, Portugal.
∗∗∗Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
Table 9A.6 Wage regression, men twenty- six to sixty- fi ve
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(Standard 
error)
(Standard 
error)
(Standard 
error)
(Standard 
error)
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
THS work –.226 –.164 –.058 –.054
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Lisbon .191 .188 .035 .040
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Educ: four years .147 .087 –.039 –.043
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗
Educ: six years .319 .206 –.044 –.048
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗
Educ: nine years .561 .348 –.041 –.048
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
Educ: twelve years .759 .459 –.022 –.028
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.016) (.017)∗
Educ: sixteen years 1.369 .849 .123 .105
(.005)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.021)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗
Age .066 .054 .068 .065
(.0005)∗∗∗ (.0005)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Age sq. –.0006 –.0005 –.0004 –.0004
(6.21e- 06)∗∗∗ (5.94e- 06)∗∗∗ (1.00e- 05)∗∗∗ (1.00e- 05)∗∗∗
Const. 4.591 5.546 4.635 4.783
(.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗
Occupation (eight dummies) — yes — yes
Worker fi xed eﬀects — — yes yes
Obs. 536,004 512,917 536,004 512,917
R2  .422  .488  .870  .872
Note: Adjusted R2 reported for the fi xed- eﬀects regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
regressions control for year of observation. Estimations based on MTSS, 1995–2000, Portugal.
∗∗∗Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
Table 9A.7 Wage regression with additional regressors, all workers
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(Standard error) (Standard error)
   (1)  (2)  
Two yrs before start THS spell –.018 –.014
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
One yr before start THS spell –.038 –.034
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Year of start of THS spell –.017 –.019
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
One yr after start of THS spell –.008 –.010
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
Two yrs after start of THS spell –.016 –.016
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
Lisbon .039 .040
(.002)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
Educ: four years –.034 –.036
(.010)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗
Educ: six years –.035 –.042
(.010)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗
Educ: nine years –.018 –.029
(.011)∗ (.011)∗∗∗
Educ: twelve years .007 –.001
(.011) (.011)
Educ: sixteen years .158 .135
(.013)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗
Age .080 .073
(.0006)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗
Age sq. –.0005 –.0005
(7.32e- 06)∗∗∗ (7.72e- 06)∗∗∗
Const. 4.407 4.669
(.015)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗
Occupation (eight dummies) — yes
Obs. 1,145,577 1,065,334
 Adjusted R2  .860  .864  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for year of observation 
and worker- fi xed eﬀects. Estimations based on MTSS, 1995–2000, Portugal.
∗∗∗Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
Table 9A.8 Wage regression with additional regressors, women sixteen to twenty- fi ve
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(Standard error) (Standard error)
   (1)  (2)  
Two yrs before start THS spell –.008 –.005
(.011) (.013)
One yr before start THS spell –.017 –.013
(.011) (.013)
Year of start of THS spell .059 .053
(.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
One yr after start of THS spell .034 .036
(.009)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗
Two yrs after start of THS spell .015 .017
(.010) (.010)∗
Lisbon .019 .022
(.007)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
Educ: four years –.169 –.227
(.111) (.123)∗
Educ: six years –.157 –.224
(.108) (.120)∗
Educ: nine years –.152 –.222
(.108) (.120)∗
Educ: twelve years –.124 –.189
(.108) (.121)
Educ: sixteen years .030 –.059
(.109) (.122)
Age .141 .074
(.009)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗
Age sq. –.002 –.0005
(.0002)∗∗∗ (.0003)∗
Const. 4.171 5.138
(.150)∗∗∗ (.179)∗∗∗
Occupation (eight dummies) — yes
Obs. 117,732 102,058
 Adjusted R2  .675  .683  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for year of observation 
and worker- fi xed eﬀects. Estimations based on MTSS, 1995–2000, Portugal.
∗∗∗Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
Table 9A.9 Wage regression with additional regressors, men sixteen to twenty- fi ve
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(Standard error) (Standard error)
   (1)  (2)  
2 yrs before start THS spell .001 .005
(.010) (.012)
One yr before start THS spell –.013 –.010
(.011) (.012)
Year of start of THS spell .028 .022
(.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗
One yr after start of THS spell .023 .012
(.009)∗∗∗ (.010)
Two yrs after start of THS spell –.001 –.005
(.009) (.010)
Lisbon .047 .050
(.007)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
Educ: four years –.009 –.018
(.034) (.042)
Educ: six years –.006 –.019
(.034) (.042)
Educ: nine years .019 .013
(.035) (.042)
Educ: twelve years .043 .038
(.036) (.043)
Educ: sixteen years .189 .160
(.043)∗∗∗ (.050)∗∗∗
Age .219 .141
(.010)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
Age sq. –.003 –.002
(.0002)∗∗∗ (.0003)∗∗∗
Const. 3.069 4.151
(.109)∗∗∗ (.146)∗∗∗
Occupation (eight dummies) — yes
Obs. 133,097 111,502
 Adjusted R2  .646  .655  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for year of observation 
and worker- fi xed eﬀects. Estimations based on MTSS, 1995–2000, Portugal.
∗∗∗Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
Table 9A.10 Wage regression with additional regressors, women twenty- six to 
sixty-fi ve
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(Standard error) (Standard error)
   (1)  (2)  
Two yrs before start THS spell –.032 –.031
(.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
One yr before start THS spell –.037 –.029
(.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
Year of start of THS spell –.014 –.014
(.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗
One yr after start of THS spell –.009 –.007
(.005)∗ (.005)
Two yrs after start of THS spell –.013 –.013
(.005)∗∗ (.006)∗∗
Lisbon .031 .029
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Educ: four years –.020 –.021
(.015) (.015)
Educ: six years –.022 –.025
(.016) (.016)
Educ: nine years –.022 –.022
(.016) (.017)
Educ: twelve years .001 .005
(.017) (.018)
Educ: sixteen years .098 .094
(.022)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗
Age .058 .057
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Age sq. –.0003 –.0003
(.00002)∗∗∗ (.00002)∗∗∗
Const. 4.695 4.815
(.029)∗∗∗ (.031)∗∗∗
Occupation (eight dummies) — yes
Obs. 364573 344148
 Adjusted R2  .873  .876  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for year of observation 
and worker- fi xed eﬀects. Estimations based on MTSS, 1995–2000, Portugal.
∗∗∗Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
Table 9A.11 Wage regression with additional regressors, men twenty- six to sixty- fi ve
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(Standard error) (Standard error)
   (1)  (2)  
Two yrs before start THS spell –.008 –.006
(.007) (.007)
One yr before start THS spell –.038 –.037
(.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
Year of start of THS spell –.065 –.059
(.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗
One yr after start of THS spell –.035 –.036
(.005)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗
Two yrs after start of THS spell –.037 –.037
(.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗
Lisbon .035 .040
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Educ: four years –.041 –.042
(.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗
Educ: six years –.046 –.047
(.014)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗
Educ: nine years –.040 –.045
(.015)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
Educ: twelve years –.021 –.025
(.016) (.017)
Educ: sixteen years .126 .110
(.022)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗
Age .068 .066
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Age sq. –.0004 –.0004
(1.00e- 05)∗∗∗ (1.00e- 05)∗∗∗
Const. 4.629 4.772
(.026)∗∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗
Occupation (eight dummies) — yes
Obs. 530,175 507,626
 Adjusted R2  .873  .874  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for year of observation 
and worker fi xed- eﬀects. Estimations based on MTSS, 1995–2000, Portugal.
∗∗∗Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
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